As a group, market forecasters are egregiously overconfident. In conformity to the dynamic model of overconfidence of Gervais and Odean (2001) 
Introduction and literature review
Man is an overconfident breed. Overconfidence arises when knowledge perception exceeds its reality. While we should not be overly surprised if individuals operating outside their natural domains fall prey to this flaw, naturally it is to be hoped that, for an individual making his living in a certain field of expertise, the actual knowledge level is high, and the perception of this level accurate.
Unfortunately the reality is that experts can be quite overconfident. 1 Theory suggests that overconfidence is likely to be more prevalent if feedback is infrequent and ambiguous (Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein (1977) ). Based on this insight, one might expect overconfidence to be less common for frequent forecasters of unambiguous events. That is to say, professional forecasters, whether they are meteorologists or sports handicappers, might be expected to develop a better sense of their knowledge and limitations through experience, and be less overconfident than neophytes. Another example of an expert prognosticator is an individual who earns her living in part by making stock market forecasts. One might expect that fairly frequent unambiguous feedback, coupled with the fact that poor performers are routinely weeded out in financial markets, should lead those surviving being good at their craft and developing a sense of their knowledge in line with its reality.
A careful examination of this issue requires some clarity on how overconfidence can best be measured, and why it is usually viewed as a negative attribute.
Unfortunately universal agreement does not exist on what overconfidence is. The
better-than-average effect (e.g., Svenson (1981) ) stems from the observation that more than 50% of the population seems to think that they are more skilled at driving than average; their children are smarter than average; they can choose stocks better than the average trader; and so on. Those subject to illusion of control (Langer (1975) ) believe that they can somehow exercise more control over events such as avoiding accidents, winning lotteries, buying hot stocks or avoiding poorly performing stocks than can realistically be possible.
These two approaches however do not lend themselves to easy quantification of overconfidence though, so a third approach to its measurement which is more convenient in this regard, namely miscalibration, is preferable. In a calibration test (Lichtenstein et al (1982) , Keren (1991) and McClelland and Bolger (1994) ), when individuals are asked to construct x% confidence intervals for currently (or soon to be) known magnitudes such as the height of Mount Everest (or the level of the Dow in a month), a percentage of individuals usually markedly below x% produce intervals that bracket the true answer. Another reason for preferring the miscalibration approach is that the new theoretical models (e.g., Kyle and Wang (1997) and Odean (1998) ), in which overconfidence plays center stage, utilize a definition of overconfidence that is most akin to miscalibration. Still, it must be acknowledged that there is no ideal overconfidence metric, a point which picks up resonance when it is observed that people's overconfidence scores using different metrics often have low correlations (Glaser and Weber (2005) ).
What damage is wrought by overconfidence? A good example is Odean (1998) , who has formulated a behavioral model that suggests that overconfident investors, believing that they possess greater precision on security valuations than is merited, trade too much and thereby lower their wealth (and expected utility). The intuition is clear: the more certain you are of your view, the less credence you will accord those of others, and the more likely you will be to transact at a price perceived favorable to your view. Barber and Odean (2000) demonstrate that investors who trade more suffer the consequences by receiving lower risk-adjusted returns. And Deaves, Lüders and Luo (2005) Fischoff (1982) , Langer and Roth (1975) , Miller and Ross (1975) and Taylor and Brown (1988) ). And confirmatory bias, the tendency to search out evidence consistent with one's prior beliefs and to ignore conflicting data, may also contribute (Forsythe, Nelson, Neumann and Wright (1992) ). A strict efficient markets view of the world would seem to argue that those fooling themselves in this way will be driven from the marketplace, but some have called this into question (Hirshleifer and Luo (2001) ).
The dynamic nature of overconfidence is stressed in the models of Subrahmanyam (1998, 2001 ) and Gervais and Odean (2001) . In the latter paper, which operates in a multi-period setting, past successes, through the mechanism of self-attribution bias, exacerbate overconfidence (while past failures tend to be ignored). The inference is that those who have had the good fortune of being successful in their fields might for a time be more overconfident than those who have just entered. Eventually however experience should reveal to people their true knowledge level.
While overconfidence can afflict individuals, it can also be endemic in markets.
The most likely trigger is high past market returns. Statman, Thorley and Vorkink (2004) show that lagged market returns are correlated with increases in trading activity. This constitutes indirect evidence of an increase in overconfidence through self-attribution bias, since behavioral models typically associate overconfidence with excessive trading. Glaser and Weber (2004) investigate whether individual investors adjust volume more in response to market returns or own-portfolio returns. They find that those who keep track of their own portfolios are more influenced by the latter, while those less aware are more likely to be influenced by market returns. While this line of research is suggestive, it relies on using volume as a proxy for overconfidence. Clearly it would be helpful to investigate whether lagged market movements and aggregate overconfidence are directly related.
The purpose of this paper is to examine both the statics and dynamics of overconfidence of stock market forecasters. We first investigate whether the respondent group as a whole is overconfident.
Next we explore whether people learn from past successes and failures, and from work experience in financial markets. Finally we consider whether the market as a whole becomes overconfident in response to high past returns. To preview, we first conclude that market forecasters are egregiously overconfident. Second, success, measured by correct prediction leads to increased overconfidence.
Third, market experience, which is symptomatic of past success, is associated with higher levels of overconfidence. And, fourth, the market does learn to be overconfident through past collective success. participants are asked to predict the inflation rate, long-term and short-term interest rates, economic activity, and stock market levels for these countries.
Until recently questions only asked for direction: that is, rise/fall/unchanged.
This questionnaire forms the basis for the well-known ZEW Finanzmarkt
Indicator, an indicator which, together with the IFO index, is one of the most important and most closely followed economic indicators in Germany. 3 Of course in Germany one of the key magnitudes to forecast is the level of the or not the forecasts are based on self-conducted research or whether they rely on others' research. Advantageously, the quantitative forecasts examined here are never more than 18 months away from when the demographic survey was conducted. This mitigates substantially the problem of respondent changes. 4 Table 1 provides a demographic snapshot. It is apparent that this group is predominately male and well-educated, 5 tends to have had an educational specialization in economics or business, and does its own research. On average the group has good experience in financial markets. Since this will be a key variable in our analysis, we show the distribution of market experience in Figure   1 . Evidently there is a very broad range and the distribution is skewed to the right.
DAX. This index is analogous to a German

Hypotheses
The first hypothesis tested is a static one:
Hypothesis 1: Market forecasters as a group are overconfident in their predictions.
Since overconfidence seems to be so prevalent in society, the finding that it exists in this realm should not surprise us. Still, we might expect only moderate levels of overconfidence since the respondents are able to fairly frequently assess how accurate their forecasts are. Moreover those performing poorly are unlikely to have long careers and many in our sample do have extensive experience in financial markets.
The next three hypotheses are dynamic in nature. Hypotheses 2 and 3 focus on the cross section, with the former conditioning on forecasting success:
Hypothesis 2: Success, measured by recent forecast accuracy, increases overconfidence, while failure (less strongly) mitigates overconfidence.
There is evidence that certain personal characteristics are correlated with overconfidence. For example, males tend to be more overconfident than females (Lundeberg, Fox and Punccohar (1994) , Beyer (1990) and Barber and Odean (2001) ). 6 And Bhandari and Deaves (2005) find that highly-educated well-paid males are especially susceptible. Past success is also argued (by Gervais and
Odean (2001)) to increase overconfidence. The thrust here is that past success triggers self-attribution bias that exacerbates overconfidence, while failures are in part ignored.
Hypothesis 3:
Success, measured by experience in financial markets, increases overconfidence.
Since survival in financial markets is a signal of persistent success, we would also expect a correlation between market experience and overconfidence. Experience however should also engender wisdom, that is, a better sense of one's limitations.
It is an empirical question as to which dominates. Nevertheless, the model of Gervais and Odean (2001) suggests the latter is the weaker force, especially at low to moderate levels of experience.
Hypothesis 4 is in terms of market-level overconfidence:
Hypothesis 4: Success at the level of the market, proxied by high lagged market returns, increases the average level of overconfidence.
As mentioned earlier, Statman, Thorley and Vorkink (2004) show that lagged market returns are correlated with increases in aggregate trading activity.
Volume however is only a proxy for overconfidence. It is preferable to test this hypothesis directly by seeking to establish a linkage between past returns and measured overconfidence.
Empirical results i. Hypothesis 1
The respondents must produce 90% confidence intervals for the DAX six months in the future. The obvious approach is to ascertain how often these intervals contain the eventually correct level of the DAX. Unfortunately the direct route is not ideal. The forecasts, while made monthly, are for six months ahead. If we use overlapping observations there will be a substantial amount of nonindependence. One surprise will have an impact on not just one forecast horizon but instead on six. A purely cross-sectional approach does not help. The problem is that a truly unexpected market event surprises not just one forecaster but everyone. An alternative is to wait six months to see if individuals are right while eschewing overlapping observations. Unfortunately, for a barely minimal number of independent observations we would have to possess 10 years of data (as opposed to just over two years).
Two indirect tests of the hypothesis that forecasters are overconfident were carried out. First, by examining a time series of the history of the DAX, we can ascertain how wide a 90% confidence interval should be. We then compare the width of respondent confidence intervals to this ideal width. If the typical width is too narrow relative to this ideal width, then we infer that forecasters are overconfident.
More specifically, we calculate, at each forecast date, historical (based on half- have F1 it is straightforward to calculate L1 and U1. Finally, using L1 and U1, we note whether or not the eventual realization of the DAX falls between the bounds.
Assuming our procedure is sound and respondents are well-calibrated, this should occur 90% of the time.
Before providing the results, it should be noted that there was one complication that had to be addressed. Respondents typically have about two weeks to make their 6-month ahead forecasts. Since they are not told to do otherwise, logically respondents would be making their forecasts for exactly six months in the future.
Using our 1-month interpolation procedure, our values are then appropriate for exactly one month in the future. But one month in the future occurs on different dates for different people. So what we in fact have to do is use respondentspecific "current" DAX values and compare intervals to respondent-specific "eventual" DAX values.
What do the data tell us? While respondents should be right 90% of the time, Figure 3 shows that in actual fact this occurs far less than that. 9 Note that at best about 80% of respondents are "right," and quite often less than 50% are right.
The inference once again is that our respondents are egregiously overconfident.
It is also instructive to view overconfidence cross-sectionally. In Figure 4 , we show a frequency distribution of the percentage of times individuals are right over the full sample. The mode suggests that many are right between 40%-70% of the time even though they are asked to be right 90% of the time. Note the spikes on the endpoints. These two groups are dominated by people who answered the survey infrequently. For example, the 22 people who had 100% accuracy on average responded to the survey only twice (vs. an overall sample average of 16.7 times), suggesting that many of the apparently underconfident were in fact lucky.
To sum up, using several (albeit imperfect) approaches, the survey data indicate that the market forecasters in our sample are egregiously (though perhaps not universally) overconfident.
ii. Hypothesis 2
The dynamics of individual overconfidence is approached in two ways. To begin, we explore whether a successful forecast (in the sense that the confidence interval contains the eventual DAX value) in the most recent period leads to a narrowing of a respondent's confidence interval in the following period.
Since overconfidence is the norm, a narrowing of intervals suggests increased overconfidence. Using the technique described above, one-month intervals are inferred from 6-month intervals. Of course it is a leap in faith to suggest that respondents will "check" in a meaningful sense how well their implicit one-month forecasts performed and adjust behavior in response. For this reason the associated noise might make it difficult to detect any innate dynamics.
More specifically, regressions of the following form are run:
where ∆CIRW i,t is the change in the width of the confidence interval (relative to the cross-sectional average width) at time t for respondent i; and RIGHT i,t is an indicator variable equaling one when the respondent's interval contains the eventual DAX value and zero otherwise. Note that a equals the change based on wrong answers; and a+b equals the change for right answers. Table 2 provides full-sample (panel) regression results. Additionally, the full sample is partitioned into roughly equal subsamples. For the full sample as well as for the first subperiod, there is extremely strong evidence that forecasters adjust the width of their confidence intervals based on how well their intervals performed in the previous month. 10 Typically when respondents get it wrong, they expand their intervals; and when they get it right they contract their intervals. Even for the second subperiod the evidence is fairly solid, in that the slope coefficient is still significant in the neighborhood of the 5% level.
Panel A of
A few other salient points can be made. First, these results are quite robust.
Cross-sectional forecast-by-forecast regressions are run and the coefficient estimates are shown in Figure 5 . The intercept is positive 23 out of 25 times, and the slope is negative all but once. In all but four cases, the absolute value of b is greater than that of a, which means that intervals contract after success (a+b<0) but expand after failure (a>0). Second, it is not possible to conclude that success has a greater impact than failure: interval contraction after success is about the same in magnitude as interval expansion after failure (since 2a is approximately equal to |b| for the full sample). 11 Strictly speaking, this is inconsistent with self-attribution bias which argues that overconfidence increases with success but does not decline as much with failure.
Third, despite the highly significant slope coefficients, the R-squared's are quite low in these regressions, which of course means that relative confidence interval widths are changing for a variety of other (unknown) reasons. The fact that we had to impute 1-month intervals from 6-month obviously exacerbates the problem. Nevertheless, quite reliably, success, or its absence, is an important force.
Fourth, the Bayesian reader may argue that the direction of confidence interval changes is a logical response to new information and thus is not necessarily indicative of increases in overconfidence. A signal (a "right" answer) that one is a good forecaster would seem to imply that confidence intervals should contract.
There is a problem, however, with this view, as revealed by Table 3 , which provides prior (over all previous months) and subsequent-month success rates for those who were right or wrong in the current month. 12 Trivially, in a month where someone gets it right, she could be said to be "underconfident" since one was asked to be right 90%, not all the time (one of one). So it is possible to argue that the "right" group intervals are being contracted to move things towards proper 90% calibration. Focus on the third and sixth columns though. In the months prior to the successful forecast (column 3) nowhere near 90% of these people got it right; and their lack of success holds up in the subsequent month (column 6). 13 This suggests of course that if they contracted their intervals they were unwise to do so -unless (oddly) the impact accorded the last observation in the Bayesian updating is excessive.
iii. Hypothesis 3
Next we look at the dynamics of individual overconfidence in a different way.
One problem with the previous dynamic approach is that it relies on respondents "checking" their forecasts. The variant of the second hypothesis focusing on financial market experience does not however require this. As mentioned earlier, a one-time demographic survey was conducted in September 2003 of the ZEW Finanzmarkttest survey participants, with about 70% of survey respondents participating in this "extra" task. Conveniently, one of the questions was years of experience working in financial markets. Recall that the model of Gervais and Odean (2001) implies that experience, at least up to a point, will exacerbate overconfidence.
We next explore this, but at the same time we can broaden our focus. First, it is possible to partition overconfidence into certainty (that is, confidence as opposed to overconfidence) and knowledge. 14 Only if the former exceeds the latter is one overconfident. Second, given our demographic data, we are also able to investigate whether other demographic factors have an impact on overconfidence (as well as on certainty and knowledge individually). The other demographic factors of interest are age, gender, educational level, area of study and whether or not one generated the forecast oneself.
In Table 4 we report the results of cross-sectional regressions on experience and age. 15 To more specifically define our dependent variables, certainty is expressed in terms of an individual's confidence interval width relative to the crosssectional average at each point in time. We then take a time series average to obtain an individual-specific average relative confidence interval width. The greater is this value, the less confident (or certain) is the individual. Thus the following metric for confidence is appropriate: Focusing first on the simple regressions where years of experience is the sole independent variable, it is apparent that, consistent with the model of Gervais and Odean (2001) , experience is detrimental in that it increases overconfidence.
To interpret, three additional years of experience increase overconfidence by 1.2% (that is, one is likely to have 1.2% fewer intervals right). Is it deteriorating knowledge or a tendency to increase certainty that leads to additional overconfidence? Note that self-attribution bias would be more consistent with the latter, but our results are otherwise. The only significant coefficient is on knowledge, with the interpretation here being that five more years of experience drops someone down 1% in the knowledge ranking. How can this be explained?
Perhaps job experience is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, additional years on the job should lead to greater wisdom. On the other hand, human nature is such that effort declines with maturity. Our evidence suggests that the second effect outweighs the first, causing more experienced people to display lower levels of knowledge (accuracy).
One might question whether it is job experience or age that drives the results.
Not surprisingly the two are highly correlated (.85). To resolve this issue, Table 4 also provides regression results where age -orthogonalized so that only its component independent of job experience can have an impact -is included as a second regressor. Clearly age adds nothing. Table 4 
Finally (not shown in
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to explore the statics and dynamics of overconfidence. Overconfidence is proxied by miscalibration. We find that the Finanzmarkttest respondent group as a whole is egregiously overconfident.
More interestingly, they do not seem learn from past successes and failures, or from experience. This flaw is also present at the level of the market as we see that high past returns induce increased aggregate overconfidence. All of this suggests that overconfidence is not only a pervasive phenomenon, but it is also one that is exceedingly difficult to eliminate.
While respondents alter their intervals dependably based on past success or failure, the low level of explanatory power suggests that there are other forces inducing changes in behavior. Indeed, an exploration into the nature of these additional factors would be a worthwhile avenue for future research. 
Month
Coefficient values
11 It is not possible to reject the hypothesis that 2a+b=0.
12 Current month success rates are definitionally 0% and 100% for the two groups. 13 The last several months are an exception, as three out of six times the "right" group gets it right at a rate of 89% or better in the subsequent month.
14 In Bhandari and Deaves (2005) , due to how overconfidence was defined, it was possible to make the metric for overconfidence exactly equal to the difference between the metrics for certainty and knowledge. Unfortunately this is not possible here.
